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Abstract 
In this paper I argue that there is no motivation to support the Strong Indexical 
Theory of Names as opposed to its counterpart the Weak Indexical Theory of Names. 
The Strong Indexical Theory, as proposed by Pelczar, argues that names are indexicals. 
According to Pelczar, names are context-sensitive to an antecedently performed speech-
act, which fixes the referent in that context. However, the content of ambiguous terms 
can also be fixed by a speech-act, and so according to the strong theory ambiguous terms 
are indexicals. Furthermore, the meaning of any term can also shift over time and thus 
unambiguous terms could potentially become ambiguous in the future. Hence, I argue 
that all terms, ambiguous and unambiguous, are indexicals according to the Strong 
Indexical Theory of Names. However, indexicals are different from other terms in that 
the content of an indexical is determined through a single social convention, while the 
content of all other terms, including names, are determined through two social 
conventions. Thus, as I argue, names are in the same semantic category as ambiguous 
terms, which is the main thesis of the Weak Indexical Theory of Names. Moreover, the 
Strong Indexical Theory claims to resolve the problem of propositional attitudes through 
an appeal to the reflexive character of names. Yet, the weak alternative also agrees that 
names have a reflexive character and can also resolve the problem through the same 
method. In the end, there is no motivation to support the strong theory as opposed to the 
Weak Indexical Theory of Names.
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1. Introduction 
The Direct Reference Theory of Names argues that names directly refer to the 
object, which they name in all possible worlds. The name is fixed to the object at some 
naming ceremony. Any person who uses the name to refer to the object should intend to 
use it in the same way as it was used in the naming ceremony. However, as Gareth Evans 
argues, the referent of some names can change over time. In an attempt to respond to this 
objection to the Direct Reference Theory, the Indexical Theory of Names was developed. 
The name of the theory comes from a comparison between names and indexicals. Names 
are similar to indexicals in that they both have two levels of meaning and a reflexive 
character. Indexicals have a character and a content, and names have a linguistic and a 
non-linguistic meaning. A reflexive character means that when the referent of the name 
or indexical is unclear, the hearer can still determine the truth conditions of the statement. 
The theory offers a successful resolution to Evans’ objection by arguing that the referent 
of the name can be determined by the context of the utterance, similar to an utterance 
with an indexical. Yet there are two alternatives to the indexical theory of names: the 
strong version and the weak version. First, the weak version argues that names are similar 
to indexicals, but are not indexical. Rather, names are more similar to ambiguous terms. 
On the other hand, the strong theory claims that names are indexicals. Pelczar offers a 
direct argument for the indexicality of names and three subsequent arguments against the 
weak theory.  
In this paper I will argue that if the strong theory is correct, and names are 
indexical, then all ambiguous terms are also indexical. This is because ambiguous terms 
are sensitive to the definition, namely the definition that the speaker appeals to. 
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Furthermore, all terms might have multiple meanings in the future and for this reason all 
terms could be ambiguous and thus indexical. However, this is an untenable consequence 
that the Strong Indexical Theory of Names cannot hold because there is something 
distinct about indexicals. The difference, I argue, is that names and ambiguous terms are 
doubly conventional while pure indexicals are singly conventional. Thus names are not 
indexicals, but they are more like ambiguous terms. Hence, the strong theory’s claim that 
names are indexical is to no avail. Furthermore, I show that the problem of propositional 
attitudes, that the Strong Indexical Theory of Names claims to resolve, can also be dealt 
with by the weak theory through the same strategy. Finally, I respond to Rami’s objection 
to the weak theory, saying that there is an equivocation between the linguistic and non-
linguistic meaning of a name. In the end, there is no reason to favor the strong theory as 
opposed to the Weak Indexical Theory of Names. 
 
2. The Direct Reference Theory of Names 
Saul Kripke developed the Direct Reference Theory of Names in his seminal 
work Naming and Necessity.1 In this work, he purports that names directly refer to the 
same object in all possible worlds. This view is opposed to the descriptivist theory that 
claims a name is able to pick out its referent through some intermediate sense. Kripke 
proposes the modal, semantic, and epistemic arguments against descriptivism, which 
demonstrate that the sense of a name is unable to uniquely identify the referent. He 
proposes that names do not have a meaning, or sense, but simply rigidly designate the 
same object across all possible worlds.  
                                                
1 Kripke (1980) 
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How the name comes to designate the referent is a question that Kripke does not 
directly answer. However, in a footnote he gives a rough outline of the causal theory of 
how the name becomes fixed with the referent. He suggests that there is an initial baptism 
of the object, and the name is fixed to the referent by the description.2 During this initial 
baptism the description is not synonymous with the name, as in descriptivism, but instead 
is used to fix the name with the referent. For instance, when a baby is born, there is a 
ceremony where the parents baptize the child with the name. Yet, the only way to fix the 
name to the child is through some description or demonstration, e.g. this child here 
(pointing to the child). During this naming ceremony the description is not synonymous 
with the name, but it is simply used to fix the referent. 
Once the name of the referent is fixed, then the causal chain begins. Those who 
were present at the baptism will pass on the name to those who were not present, and so 
on. When the name is passed on from one person to the next, Kripke thinks that the 
receiver must intend to use the same referent as the person who told it to him.3 If this link 
is kept strong and those who use the name all have the same referent, then it does not 
matter if the description of the referent is incorrect. For instance, when we talk about 
Benjamin Franklin, so long as the referent remains fixed, then it is not important if our 
description of him is complete or accurate. However, we have quite a bit of difficulty 
keeping the name and the reference fixed. Kripke gives the example of the names ‘St. 
Nicolas’ and ‘Santa Claus’ as an instance of how the referent can change over time. At 
one point in time, the two names referred to the same person, but over time a disconnect 
                                                
2 Kripke (1980) p. 96 
3 Ibid. 
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grew. Gareth Evans uses this inconsistency to note a potential problem for Kripke’s 
theory of names.4 
Evans acknowledges that Kripke does not fully endorse the causal theory, but 
Evans uses the rough outline as a starting point. His objection to the causal theory is that 
it cannot account for instances when the referent of the name shifts. He uses the example 
of Madagascar to demonstrate how the referent of a name can shift. The natives of Africa 
use the name ‘Madagascar’ to refer to the part of the African mainland. When Marco 
Polo traveled to this part of the world, he came to learn how the native inhabitants used 
the name. Later, through a miscommunication with Malay or Arab sailors, the name 
became used to designate the island off the coast of Africa. This miscommunication 
between Marco Polo and the other sailors led to the name ‘Madagascar’ designating the 
island. According to Evans, the causal theory of names is not able to account for this shift 
since the name was fixed at the initial baptism. Evans says, “The intention of the speakers 
to use the name to refer to something must be allowed to count in determination of what 
it denotes.”5 He suggests that something more than the initial baptism is needed to ground 
the name to the referent, which, in this case, is the speaker’s intention. The Indexical 
Theory of Names purports to resolve this issue by making the referent of the name 
sensitive to context.  
 
3. Content and Character  
                                                
4 Evans (1973) (1980) 
5 Evans (1973) p. 196 
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Before I expand on the Indexical Theory of Names, I first need to explain David 
Kaplan’s theory of indexicals and his use of the character content distinction. When I say 
the phrase ‘I am hungry’ it expresses something different than when you say ‘I am 
hungry’. Clearly we have said two different things if the truth value is different, but in 
this instance we each might have said something different despite them both being true. 
The difference in this circumstance is what Kaplan calls the content. He defines content 
as a “function from circumstances of evaluation to an appropriate extension.”6 So the 
content of the sentence, 
(1) John went snowboarding today  
is 〈John, went, snowboarding, 3/25/2015〉. If you wanted to express the same content the 
next day, you would have to say  
(2) John went snowboarding yesterday 
The content of this latter sentence is the same as the former even though the verbal 
expressions are different. 
The character of a word is generally thought of as the meaning because most 
words have the same content in all contexts. This is called a constant character and a 
constant content. So in all context and circumstances of evaluation the word has the same 
extension. However, indexicals have a non-constant content because their content 
changes from context to context. From above, the contents of (1) and (2) are the same, 
but the character of the terms ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’ are different. Both of these terms 
have a constant character that is able to determine the content. Kaplan notes that 
character is neither directly referential nor always able to determine the content in each 
                                                
6 Kaplan p. 502 
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context.7 By this he means that there are situations when the character of a word fails to 
pick out the content. For instance, if you came across a piece of paper with the sentence  
(3) ‘I like snowboarding’  
written on it, from this context it is not possible to determine the extension of this 
sentence, nor is it possible to determine the referent. The character of this sentence is 〈the 
writer of this sentence, likes, snowboarding, t1〉. The Indexical Theory of Names makes 
use of this distinction between character and content and purports that names have a 
similar distinction. A proper name has two meanings: the linguistic and the non-linguistic 
meaning. The linguistic meaning is similar to the character, and the non-linguistic 
meaning is similar to the content.  
 
4. Indexical Theory 
Paula Milne gives a general summary of the indexical theory in her paper To 
What Extent Do Proper Names Resemble Indexicals?8 She suggests that there are two 
main versions to indexical theories, what I call the Strong Indexical Theory and the Weak 
Indexical Theory. The strong alternative purports that names are indexicals, while the 
weak version claims that names are indexical-like, but not indexicals. The former thinks 
that names are context sensitive to the dubbing-in-force (I will explain this term later in 
Section 7 of this paper), similar to how ‘I’ is sensitive to the utterer or ‘now’ is sensitive 
to the time of the utterance. The latter theory argues that context is used to narrow down 
the possible content of the name in an utterance, more similar to how context helps to 
                                                
7 Kaplan p. 505 
8 Milne (2005) 
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determine the meaning of an ambiguous term. Both of these versions of the indexical 
theory agree that names and indexicals both have a reflexive character. Reflexive 
character means that the hearer of an utterance might not be able to determine the content 
of the statement, but they would be able to understand the truth conditions that would 
make the statement true. The reflexive character is employed for indexicals when the 
hearer is not sure who or where or when the statement was uttered, and for names when 
the referent of the name is unclear to the hearer. 
Take, for example, the sentence,  
(4) Barack Obama likes dogs. 
This sentence is true iff there is a person and this person bears the name ‘Barack Obama’ 
that is causally linked to the person through a naming ceremony, and that person also 
likes dogs. The linguistic meaning of the name ‘Barack Obama’ is that there is a person 
who bears this name and this person may or may not have the property of liking dogs. 
The linguistic-meaning does not require that the person have the property of liking dogs. 
This is only important for the truth conditions of a sentence with a name. The non-
linguistic meaning of ‘Barack Obama’ is that there is a person who is causally linked to 
the name through a naming ceremony. Similar to sentence (3), even if the referent of the 
name is unclear, the truth conditions of the sentence are apparent, namely (4) is true iff 
there is a person who bears the name Barack Obama and that person likes dogs. So, an 
understanding of the sentence does not require that the hearer have an acquaintance with 
the referent, but that the hearer understands that ‘Barack Obama’ is a name and that a 
social convention is being employed.  
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Along with giving a linguistic meaning of names, the indexical theory is able to 
account for the problem of shifting reference. The indexical theory says that the referent 
of a name is determined by the context of the current situation. Since, for instance, the 
current social convention associated with ‘Madagascar’ refers to the island, when the 
name is used it refers to the island. However, if someone wanted to specify that they were 
referring to the part of the mainland, then they would be expected to explicitly say 
something to the effect of, ‘the part of the mainland formerly known as Madagascar’. In 
this context, the reference of the sentence is fixed.  
 
5. John Perry’s Theory 
John Perry argues that names are similar but different from indexicals. First, he 
purports that names are similar to indexicals because in both cases context is used to 
determine the referent.9 Each name is associated with many different people through 
different naming conventions. When the token of a name is used in a sentence the hearer 
might not be able to determine whom the sentence is designating. In a typical 
conversation, if someone says,  
(5) Frank was brave  
‘Frank’ could refer to any of the multitude of individuals with that name. But Perry 
follows the Gricean conversational maxims, namely quality and relation. The maxim of 
relation stipulates that the interlocutors should only make relevant comments. So when 
the audience hears this utterance, they should assume that the speaker is talking about a 
Frank that they mutually know. Furthermore, the maxim of quality requires that the 
                                                
9 Perry p. 7 
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interlocutors tried to be truthful. So if they mutually know more than one person named 
Frank, then the audience should assume that the speaker is referring to the Frank that did 
something brave. But, again, if the referent of the sentence is still not clear, then Perry 
suggests that the audience ask whom the speaker is talking about.  
Yet, Perry thinks that names are not indexicals because context is being used in a 
different way to determine the referent. For indexicals, it is the meaning of the word that 
determines the contextual relation between the utterance and the referent, e.g., the 
meaning of ‘I’ determines that the referent is the utterer or writer. On the other hand, 
names use context to narrow down the different possible naming conventions that the 
speaker is exploiting. This is what is happening in the example of Frank from above. 
Perry calls this ambiguity as opposed to indexicality,10 because context is used in the 
same way as ambiguous terms.  
 
6. Pelczar’s Arguments for The Strong Indexical Theory of Names 
Pelczar offers a direct argument for the indexicality of names, and then offers 
three arguments against Perry’s conclusion. The direct argument purports that there is a 
difference between ambiguous terms and names. Thus, names should not be considered 
to be ambiguous. Pelczar thinks that Perry’s argument against the indexicality of names 
can be interpreted in three different ways: names are not indexicals because they lack 
specificity, are not tidy, and are underdetermined. Pelczar’s three arguments show that 
there are some indexicals that do not meet these three criteria, yet are still considered 
                                                
10 Perry p.7 
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indexicals. Since Perry’s argument does not preclude indexicals that do not meet these 
criteria, proper names should not be precluded from being indexicals. 
 
6.1 Direct Argument 
Pelczar argues that there is a difference between ambiguous terms and names. For 
a person to be considered a competent user of an ambiguous term, such as bill, they do 
not need to understand all of the different meanings. For example, if a person did not 
understand the sentence ‘The tractor drove over the bill’, but did understand the meaning 
of the sentence ‘I received a huge gas bill’, then we would maintain that they are still a 
competent user of the term ‘bill’ in the latter sense. Meaning that if a person does not 
understand one use of a word it is not counted against his being a competent user of the 
term, so long as he understands one of the meanings of the term. On the other hand, if a 
person did not understand the meaning of the sentence using a name like ‘Bill’, we could 
count this one instance against him as not knowing the linguistic meaning of the name 
‘Bill’. In other words, if a person did not understand the meaning of a sentence with a 
name, because they did not understand that name, then this person does not understand 
the reflexive truth conditions of the name. For a person to be a competent user of a name 
they must be able to understand the linguistic meaning in more than one instance of the 
name. Pelczar argues that being a competent user of a name is similar to being a 
competent user of an indexical. If a person is a competent user of an indexical, they must 
be able to understand the meaning in more than one instance. Thus, Pelczar concludes 
that names are not simply ambiguous, but are actually indexicals. 
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6.2 Pelczar’s Arguments Against Perry 
Pelczar takes Perry to mean that names are different from indexicals because 
names lack specificity, are messy, and are underdetermined. First, each indexical has a 
different meaning that is able to determine the referent of the sentence. This idea opposes 
that of names, which have a general meaning that is able to determine the referent. 
Pelczar claims that this is not true for all indexicals such as ‘this’ and ‘that’. These two 
indexicals have the same meaning that determines the referent. So the terms ‘this’ and 
‘that’ have the same meaning, i.e. the object that the speaker is pointing to. Since a lack 
of specificity does not preclude these terms from being indexicals, Pelczar argues that it 
should not preclude names either. 
Next, Pelczar takes Parry to argue that indexicals have a tidy rule that is able to 
pick out the referent, while names seem to be messy. Pelczar thinks that an appeal to 
social conventions to determine the referent “quickly leads to the consideration of 
multifarious factors, semantic, pragmatic, and even extra-linguistic, that, to say the least, 
resist tidy encapsulation.”11 On the other hand, the rules for indexicals are more candid. 
For instance, the rule for ‘now’ is the time of the utterance. However, Pelczar argues that 
not all indexicals have such orderly meanings. Consider the meaning of the term ‘here’, 
which is not so clearly defined. When a person says, “Steve lives here,” it is not clear 
where ‘here’ is referring to, i.e. the room, the house, the town or the country in which the 
speaker is located. Since the vagueness of the meaning does not seem to preclude ‘here’ 
from being an indexical, Pelczar concludes that name should not be ruled out for this 
reason. 
                                                
11 Pelczar (2001) p. 143 
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Finally, Pelczar takes Perry to argue that names are underdetermined and hence 
are not indexicals. Take the example (5) from above. In this example it is not clear to 
whom the speaker is referring and the audience is supposed to ask which Frank the 
speaker was referring to. In this instance, the name is underdetermined and the referent is 
identified by the speaker’s intentions. On the contrary, indexicals are always supposed to 
determine the referent, e.g. ‘I’ always identifies the speaker.12 But Pelczar argues that this 
is not the case for all indexicals, such as ‘he’. The meaning of the term ‘he’ is the salient 
male, but the referent is not always salient. Suppose the speaker is comparing three males 
and says, “He is the strongest,” The speaker’s intentions might not be clear and the 
audience might have to ask to whom he is referring. Again, since indexicals like ‘he’ are 
not precluded from being indexicals because the referent is underdetermined, it follows 
that names should not be ruled out as being indexicals for this same reason.13 
 
7. The Strong Indexical Theory of Names 
The character of a word depends on the kind of context to which an utterance 
might be sensitive. According to Kaplan, the character might be sensitive to four types of 
context: utterer, time, spatial position, and possible world.14 So ‘I’ is sensitive to the 
utterer, ‘now’ is sensitive to the time, and so on. Pelczar suggested a fifth type of context 
                                                
12 When a person uses the term ‘I’ they are referring to themselves. However, there are 
instances when a person is directly quoting another person and in this case ‘I’ is referring 
to the original utterer of the quote. 
13 Milne claims that Pelczar’s objections to Perry’s argument are based on a 
misinterpretation of Reflexivity, Indexicality and Names. Furthermore, she argues that 
Perry is able to answer these objections, although he has not directly addressed them 
himself. 
14 Kaplan p. 498 
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sensitivity. He says, “[T]he significance of an utterance sometimes depends on contextual 
factors determined by antecedently-performed speech acts.”15 In this case the speaker 
makes a stipulation that is supposed to influence how the audience understands the 
ensuing statement(s). This stipulation is what Pelczar calls the ‘dubbing-in-force’. A 
dubbing is similar to Kripke’s naming ceremony, where a name is fixed to the referent. 
The dubbing is said to be ‘in force’ if the item that was named in that dubbing ceremony 
bears the name that it was given in that ceremony. Pelczar asserts, if dubbing-in-force is a 
kind of context sensitivity, then all words that are fixed by a dubbing ceremony – such as 
names – are indexical. 
Pelczar says that the idea of dubbing-in-force is very complex and hence he does 
not give a systematic way to determine which dubbings are in force in a given context. 
Although, he notes that it cannot be the person who has been dubbed with a name at the 
time of an utterance because there will be countless people who have been dubbed with a 
name. It is when there is more than one dubbing-in-force that causes confusion. 
Confusions leads to problems like Hesperus and Phosphorus, since there are two 
dubbings-in-force for the same object. Similar to Perry, the audience can simply ask their 
interlocutor which dubbing is in force. When your interlocutor gives an answer, one of 
the contending dubbings-in-force becomes salient. Also, the dubbing-in-force might 
become salient through context of the conversation, taking for granted the Gricean 
maxims of conversation.  
Pelczar looks at the Madagascar example from Evans’ objection, mentioned 
earlier in Section 2. He states that this example is clearer because the dubbings-in-force 
                                                
15 Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) p. 294 
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vary over time. Pelczar claims that indexicals are on a spectrum from high frequency of 
variability to low frequency of variability. He claims that indexicals either have 
synchronic variability, meaning it varies across contexts of utterance in the same time, or 
diachronic variability, meaning it varies over time.16  
To say that a competent speaker knows the meaning of a name does not mean that 
they are required to know the referent of the name. This is because to understand the 
meaning of a sentence with an indexical, you do not need to understand the referent of 
the indexical. Rather to be a competent speaker of the language, you would only need to 
understand the character of the indexical. Similarly, Pelczar purports that when a 
competent speaker knows the meaning of a name, they understand that the name refers to 
the item that was named in the dubbing-in-force in the context of the utterance. In other 
words, when a competent speaker knows the meaning of a name, they only need to know 
the linguistic meaning and are not required to know the non-linguistic meaning.  
 
8. Arguments Against The Strong Indexical Theory of Names 
First, I want to show that the Strong Indexical Theory of Names leads to the 
conclusion that all words are indexicals. By this, I mean to show that if the Strong 
Indexical Theory is correct and names are context sensitive to the dubbing-in-force, then 
other ambiguous terms are sensitive to the definition-in-force. Furthermore, even 
unambiguous terms could be sensitive to the definition-in-force and hence all terms are 
context sensitive and thus indexicals. However, the Strong Indexical Theory of Names 
                                                
16 He does say that this list might not be exhausted. That is, indexicals might vary in 
some fashion other than synchronic or diachronic. 
Two Indexical Theories of Names  17 
would need to give an explanation for the difference between pure indexicals and other 
terms. This explanation is that indexicals are singly conventional while other terms are 
doubly conventional. Thus, names, as being doubly conventional, are in the same 
category as ambiguous terms and not indexicals, which was the original position of the 
Weak Indexical Theory. My second objection to the Strong Indexical Theory of Names is 
that there is no motivation for supporting the strong alternative as opposed to the weak 
theory, because both theories agree with the linguistic meaning and reflexive truth 
conditions of both names and indexicals. 
 
8.1 Strong Leads to Weak  
The motivation for my first objection comes from Pelczar’s argument that a name 
is sensitive to an antecedently performed speech act.17 This sensitivity means that there 
are circumstances when a person might qualify their statement to direct the audience to a 
specific content. When a person qualifies their statement regarding a specific person to 
whom they are referring, it is called the “dubbing-in-force.” For example, if the speaker 
wanted to refer to the Madagascar as the native Africans did, he would have to stipulate 
that he is referring to the part of the African mainland. In this circumstance, when the 
audience hears the name ‘Madagascar’ they understand that the name is referring to the 
part of the African mainland. Since the referent of the name is sensitive to stipulations of 
the speaker, Pelczar thinks that names should be considered indexicals. 
Yet, a speaker can make stipulations about the meaning of any word in an 
utterance to ensure that the audience is directed to a specific content. Although this 
                                                
17 Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) p. 294 
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speech-act is not a dubbing-in-force (because dubbing only refers to a naming ceremony), 
it might be called something different – such as the “definition-in-force.” So the 
definition is the meaning of the word or phrase, and the definition is in force in a certain 
context if, in that context, the word bears the meaning of that definition. For instance, a 
speaker might say, “By key I mean the crucial step, and the key to opening the door is 
pulling the handle up before pushing the door open.” In this statement, the speaker 
stipulated that the definition-in-force for the term ‘key’ is the crucial step. So ambiguous 
terms are sensitive to the same antecedently performed speech act – the definition-in-
force. Since terms are contextually sensitive to the definition-in-force, as names are 
sensitive to dubbings-in-force, then all potentially ambiguous terms are an indexical; that 
is, any term that has multiple and varying lexical meanings. 
Furthermore, since the definition of a term can change over time, then any term 
could be ambiguous with respect to some future meaning. Suppose that there is a word 
that is unambiguous, that is, it has one and only one meaning.18 Seeing as this word 
currently has only one meaning does not imply that in the future this word could not have 
more than one meaning. This multiplication of meanings is similar to the Madagascar 
example, in that the meaning of the word changes very slowly over time. So slow, in fact, 
that we have not seen it change yet, but this slow evolution does not mean that it will not 
change in the future. Thus, even terms that are not ambiguous (at least not ambiguous 
yet) would also be considered indexicals under the standards set by the Strong Indexical 
Theory of Names. 
                                                
18 I say supposing there is such a terms, because I am not sure if any word has only one 
definition  
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So if we take names to be context sensitive to the dubbing-in-force, all terms are 
context sensitive with respect to some antecedent speech act. However, if all terms are 
indexical, then what makes pure indexicals (as Kaplan thought of them) different from 
other terms?19 Pelczar says that the difference between names and pure indexicals is that 
names are connected to the referent through some social convention, the dubbing.20 If we 
take the character of a word to be a social convention, then indexicals would also 
determine the referent through a convention. It follows that names are doubly 
conventional, that is, the referent is fixed through the antecedent speech act and through 
the character of the term, while only the character fixes the referent of the indexical. 
Similarly, all other terms would be doubly conventional, and the distinction between pure 
indexicals and other terms would be this level of social convention. Thus, names are in 
the same category as ambiguous terms while indexicals are different. Since this is the 
original thesis of the Weak Indexical Theory of Names, the strong theory’s claim that 
names are indexical is to no avail. 
 
8.2. The Indexical Theory of Names and Propositional Attitudes 
One of the main motives for accepting the Strong Indexical Theory of Names is 
that it purports to explain the problem of propositional attitudes. A propositional attitude 
is a relation between a person’s mental state and a proposition, e.g. Justin believes that P. 
The problem of propositional attitude is that some proposition that a person holds might 
be inconsistent. For example, 
                                                
19 Kaplan through that pure indexicals are terms such as ‘I’, ‘Here’, ‘Now’ 
20 Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) p. 297-8 
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(6) Justin believes that Bob Dylan has musical talent and that Robert Zimmerman 
does not have musical talent. 
This belief is inconsistent because Bob Dylan and Robert Zimmerman are the same 
person. The problem of propositional attitudes is to explain how a coherent person can 
have inconsistent propositional attitudes. This is a problem that the direct reference 
theory is unable to resolve because names directly refer and can be substituted salva 
veritate. 
Although this argument is not successful, it is worth noting that both indexical 
theories of names are able to resolve this issue through the same strategy. Pelczar argues 
that when an indexical is within a propositional attitude, the subject is not required to 
understand the non-linguistic meaning of the indexical or the content. Within a 
propositional attitude the subject is only required to know the character of the indexical. 
So take the sentence, 
(7) Mary believes that I am tall. 
Mary can understand the meaning of this sentence without understanding the content of 
the sentence. Thus, Mary can understand the truth conditions of the sentence without 
understanding who is the referent of the indexical. Mary understands that (7) is true iff 
the utterer of the sentence is tall, without her knowing who uttered the sentence. Pelczar 
argues that this line of thought also applies to names in the same way. So for the 
sentence, 
(8) Mary believes that Tom Costigan is tall. 
Pelzcar thinks that for Mary to understand the meaning of this sentence, she only needs to 
understand the linguistic meaning of the name. For Mary to understand this sentence, she 
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needs to know that there is a person who was named ‘Tom Costigan’ in a naming 
ceremony and that that person is tall. So in statements like, 
(9) Thales believes that Hesperus is shining and disbelieves that Phosphorus is 
shining.21 
Thales is coherent because he understands the linguistic meaning of the sentence, even 
though he does not know that both Hesperus and Phosphorus refer to the same object. So 
the solution to the puzzle, according to the Strong Indexical Theory, is that a person can 
be coherent and have inconsistent propositional attitudes because the person does not 
have to know the content of the name to understand the sentence. In other words, to be 
coherent the person only needs to understand the linguistic meaning of the name, that is, 
the reflexive truth conditions.   
The weak version of the indexical theory, however, would be able to explain 
propositional attitudes in the same way. The weak version of this theory suggests that 
names are similar to indexicals because they have a reflexive truth condition. So the 
linguistic meaning of statement (7) is ‘Mary believes that the utterer of this sentence is 
tall’. Similarly, the linguistic meaning of statement (8) is that there is some person who is 
linked to the name ‘Tom Costigan’ through some naming convention, and that that 
person is tall. Since the Strong Indexical Theory of Names resolves this puzzle through 
an appeal to the linguistic meaning of a name and the reflexive truth conditions, the weak 
theory is also able to resolve the puzzle because the weak theory agrees that names have a 
linguistic meaning and reflexive truth conditions. Thus, the Strong Indexical Theory is 
not able to solve this puzzle in a way that is not available to the Weak Indexical Theory. 
                                                
21 Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) p. 306 
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However, since both theories suppose that names are directly referential, it suggests that 
neither theory is truly able to resolve this puzzle. Thus, even if the Strong Indexical 
Theory of Names was able to resolve this problem, there would be no reason to prefer it 
because the Weak Indexical Theory of Names is able to exploit the same strategies. 
 
9. Objections and Replies 
Rami raises an objection to the Weak Indexical Theory of Names, which he calls 
the problem of shared names. He argues that homophonic ambiguous terms have 
different origins, histories, and meanings. By this he means that there are two different 
words with different meanings, but coincidently have the same pronunciation (and 
spelling).22 Rami says that for the Weak Indexical Theory of Names “different referents 
correspond to different meanings of a name”.23 Thus he claims that in each naming 
ceremony there is a new name that is being used to refer to that object, albeit the same 
pronunciation and spelling as similar names. For instance, when a person is named 
‘George’ at a naming ceremony this is a different name than the one given to any other 
person named George. To differentiate between these two names a subscripted number 
might be used. So, in this naming ceremony the person would be named ‘GeorgeN’. Thus 
he concludes that if names are ambiguous terms, then no two objects can have the very 
same name. Since we do think that two objects can have the same name, we should reject 
the notion that names are ambiguous terms. 
                                                
22 In the principle of generosity, I take Rami to mean only homographic and homophonic 
words, so I will not consider heterotrophic examples of homophonic words.  
23 Rami p. 123 
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However, this objection is grounded in an equivocation between the kinds of 
meaning a term has. The Weak Indexical Theory of Names thinks that there is a linguistic 
meaning and a non-linguistic meaning of terms. An ambiguous term is ambiguous 
because it has different linguistic meanings. For example, the term ‘tap’ has more than 
one linguistic meaning or definition. It could mean, among other things, a faucet for 
drawing water from a pipe or a light touch or stroke. This word seems to have come from 
different histories and origins24, as Rami suggests, but coincidently has the same 
pronunciation and spelling. On the other hand, names are ambiguous because they have 
different non-linguistic meanings. The non-linguistic meaning of a name is fixed to the 
object during the naming ceremony. So, the non-linguistic meaning of the name ‘George’ 
is different for each person who shares that name. Yet, the name has the same linguistic 
meaning, i.e. a person named George. So when two people share the same name this 
means that their names have the same linguistic meaning, but they have different non-
linguistic meanings. Thus, Rami’s objection to the Weak Indexical Theory of Names is 
based on an equivocation between the different kinds of meanings a term or name can 
have. 
Furthermore, the Weak Indexical Theory of Names does not claim that names are 
ambiguous terms. The theory, as propounded by Perry, argues that names are merely 
similar to ambiguous terms. Both ambiguous terms and names use context in a similar 
way, i.e. to narrow down the possible meanings of the term or name. But again, the 
difference between ambiguous terms and names is that the former has many linguistic 
                                                
24 The former comes from Proto-Germanic (c. late 1400) the latter comes from Gallo-
Roman (c. 1200). From http://www.etymonline.com 
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meanings while the latter has many non-linguistic meaning. Perry uses the term 
ambiguous for lack of a better word to draw a connection between names and ambiguous 
terms. This analogy is also meant to show that the use of context to determine the referent 
of a name is different from the use of context for an indexical term. Thus, the Weak 
Indexical Theory of Names offers a theory where names are similar to indexicals because 
of their reflexive character, and they are similar to ambiguous terms because of their use 
of context. Yet, the weak theory thinks that names are neither indexical nor ambiguous 
terms. 
 
Conclusion 
The Indexical Theory of Names was developed to explain how the referent of a 
name can shift over time, like Madagascar. Although, the two alternative versions of the 
theory disagreed to what extent names are similar to indexicals. The Strong Indexical 
Theory of Names argues that names are indexicals because they are sensitive to the 
dubbing-in-force. On the other hand, the Weak Indexical Theory thinks that names were 
merely similar to indexicals, but more similar to ambiguous terms, because the role of 
context in determining the content. However, for the strong theory, if names are sensitive 
to the dubbing-in-force, then ambiguous terms are sensitive to the definition-in-force, and 
should be counted as indexicals. Furthermore, the meaning of an unambiguous term 
could change in the future, and similar to Madagascar, the meaning changes slowly over 
time. So, unambiguous terms should also be counted as indexicals. Yet indexicals are 
separated from all other terms because the meaning is singly conventional, while other 
terms and names are doubly conventional. Thus we come back to the Weak Indexical 
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Theory, where names are indexical-like, but they are more similar to ambiguous terms. 
Moreover, the strong theory claims to resolve the problem of propositional attitudes 
through an appeal to the linguistic meaning of a name and the reflexive truth conditions. 
Nevertheless the weak theory could also appeal to the same strategy for resolving this 
puzzle, because the weak theory agrees that names have a linguistic meaning and a 
reflexive truth condition. Finally, I respond to the shared names objection by saying that 
this objection is based on an equivocation between the linguistic and the non-linguistic 
meaning of a name. When two people share a name they share the linguistic meaning of 
the name and not the non-linguistic meaning. In the end, there is no reason to prefer the 
Strong Indexical Theory of Names as opposed to the Weak Indexical Theory, because the 
strong theory leads to the untenable consequence that all terms are indexical, and both the 
strong and the weak theories are able to resolve the problem of propositional attitudes in 
the same way. 
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